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Abstract
The EU–Russia summit that took place on June 4 in St Petersburg met expectations for two reasons. Firstly, expectations 
prior to the summit were low: nobody was under any illusion that the summit would result in a radical breakthrough. 
Secondly, the biannual EU–Russia summits tend to produce symbolic rather than practical outcomes.
This article was originally published in English by FRIDE in July 2012
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The June EU-Russia summit: 
no surprises
The first EU–Russia summit since Vladimir Putin’s return 
to the Russian presidency was supposed to display 
harmony between the two sides, rather than exposing 
their differences. The official message from the sum-
mit states that the relationship between Moscow and 
Brussels is strong, with the potential for even greater 
improvement in the future. The EU acted wisely by ini-
tiating a dialogue with the newly-elected Russian presi-
dent. Brussels clearly recognises Russia’s importance as 
a strategic partner, and wants to build on the ‘signifi-
cant progress on a number of issues’ that the EU–Russia 
relationship has made in recent years. The same can be 
said of Putin himself, who confirmed the strategic na-
ture of Russia–EU relations, stating that the EU’s impor-
tance to Russia was second only to the Eurasian Union.
Putin and his guests from Brussels gave controversial 
issues a wide berth: the situation in Syria was only men-
tioned briefly, with both sides verbally rejecting the use 
of force. There was no talk of the controversial Ballistic 
Missile Defence system planned for Europe or of Rus-
sia’s ban on EU meat. The ballot fraud at Russia’s recent 
presidential and parliamentary elections was also off 
the agenda. However, the summit did touch on issues 
which have been hampering efforts to forge a new 
broad-based cooperation agreement after four years of 
talks, including energy supplies, trade and market ac-
cess, a visa-free travel regime and human rights. None 
of these differences was solved at the summit. Its main 
achievement was to demonstrate the readiness of both 
sides to continue the EU-Russia dialogue – however 
difficult it may be.
With Putin’s return to presidency, political analysts both 
in Russia and abroad are trying to predict whether 
there will be fundamental changes or continuity in Rus-
sia’s foreign policy. Generally speaking, radical foreign 
policy changes in a given country occur only as a result 
of radical external or internal changes (such as the col-
lapse of the USSR). With a routine leadership change, it 
is usually new overtones and emphases that define a 
new foreign policy course. Although many experts say 
that the ‘new’ Putin won’t be any different from the ‘old’ 
one, complete continuity is impossible since he has 
come to power in a markedly different domestic and 
foreign policy situation.
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The new context of EU-Russia relations
Both Russia and Europe are experiencing important 
political, economic and social transformations with 
strong implications fortheir relationship. In the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis, it dawned on the Russian 
population that having a modern economy meant be-
ing part of the modern world which in Russia’s case 
largely comprises the EU (as its main trading part-
ner), the US, Japan and South Korea. The realignment 
of Russia’s relations with the US, the EU, Norway and 
Ukraine was a reflection of this new understanding. 
President Dmitry Medvedev launched the strategy un-
der the title ‘Partnership for Modernisation’, which was 
then endorsed by a joint Russia–EU declaration. The 
imperative to modernise was creating a new model 
for Russian relations with the European Union and the 
West at large, although from the outset there was no 
consensus among the Russian political elite on what 
exactly modernization entailed.
As Putin returns to presidency he faces a very differ-
ent Europe. The ongoing eurozone crisis has already 
resulted in damage to the EU’s reputation as a model 
of both competent economic policy management and 
successful regional integration and multilateral coop-
eration. As a result of the crisis and intense competition 
from emerging powers, the EU’s values-based foreign 
policy is being replaced by economisation, re- nation-
alisation and bilateralisation. EU member states are 
competing for economic deals with Russia and China. 
In short, the crisis has dealt a heavy blow to the attrac-
tiveness of the EU soft power model for third countries 
– including Russia.
It is not just Europe that has changed, however: Putin 
is also confronted with a new Russia. In 2000 he was 
required to reinstate stability after years of chaos and 
humiliation. Now the situation is different. Although 
nobody doubted in Putin’s electoral victory, there was 
strong opposition to his return. Protests have been trig-
gered by the September decision of the duumvirate of 
Putin and Medvedev to swap seats and the electoral 
fraud in December. Nonetheless, they should be viewed 
in the broader context of Russia’s post-Communist evo-
lution, which has entered a new phase. The collapse 
of the USSR resulted in market economy reforms (with 
admittedly mixed results), but no steps were taken to 
create a solid foundation for Russia’s political democra-
tisation. In 2012, a proportion of the Russian population 
does not want just stability, but also seeks democratic 
political reforms. The existing politico-economic sys-
tem can no longer adequately address growing social 
demands. The system must change if Russia is to de-
velop further. Without political reform this will not be 
possible and popular protests will persist.
When he came to power in 2000, Putin hoped to 
improve Russia’s global prestige not on the basis of 
unilateral concessions as Yeltsin had, but on an equal 
footing with other key powers. His expectations were 
disappointed by the West after 9/11. Russia has yet 
to find its proper place in post-bipolar Europe, partly 
due to its own mistakes but largely because of the 
short-sighted policies of its Western partners. Now 
Putin has no illusions about the integration of Russia 
with the West. He wants Russia to remain a sovereign 
centre of power, with its area ofprimaryinfluence-
basedontheEurasian Union (virtual though it is for 
the time being). At the St Petersburg summit, Putin 
stated that the Eurasian Union would play an increas-
ingly important role on the global stage, adding that 
the EU would have to deal with the Eurasian Union’s 
commission along with Moscow. The Eurasian Union 
is undoubtedly an important new dimension of Rus-
sia’s foreign policy.
The focus on Russia’s Eurasian vocation comes at a 
time of uncertainty concerning the country’s prospects 
for modernisation. In all likelihood, Putin feels that Rus-
sia should no longer solicit modernisation guidance 
from the weakened EU. From his point of view, Euro-
peans are in no position to lecture other countries on 
good governance and democracy. According to Putin, 
now is the time to devise an efficient mechanism for 
upgrading the national economy by launching a New 
Industrialisation plan based on sophisticated technolo-
gies. It is not yet apparent how this will be synchronised 
with the Partnership for Modernisation nor where Rus-
sia could obtain the advertised ‘sophisticated technolo-
gies’ for its re- industralisation. Is ‘New Industrialisation’ 
simply a catchy term for modernisation without the 
democratisation issues? As former Russian Prime Min-
ister Yevgeny Primakov explained, a modernisation 
strategy doesn’t imply mere adoption of western coun-
tries’ achievements. Russia is not yet ready to become 
a post-industrial society, renouncing industrial produc-
tion in favour of science and services. Instead of leaping 
straight into a post-industrial state, Russia must follow 
the ‘re-industrialisation’ strategy that Putin is offering. 
Primakov stressed that Russia should adopt not only 
western technological and scientific achievements, but 
also the breakthroughs and positive trends of Soviet 
science that have been unjustly forgotten.
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Russia’s domestic discourse 
on the Euro crisis
Russia’s domestic debate over the EU crisis is key to under-
standing the future of EU– Russia relations. There is an ideo-
logical divide within Russia’s academic and political commu-
nity between ‘Modernisers’ and ‘Eurasianists’. The latter say 
that the current EU crisis is the best evidence of the move-
ment of the centre of economic activity to Asia, and that 
the Western model of sustainable economic development 
has already exhausted its resources. Therefore Russia should 
follow its own path, based around the Eurasian Union. The 
idea is not new. Russia has been debating its national iden-
tity for the past 200 years; embroiled in endless arguments 
over whether Russians are Europeans or Eurasians. The doc-
trine of ‘Eurasianism’ places geographical location above the 
basic principles of a country’s socio-economic and political 
development. The Eurasian camp consists of three political 
forces: Communists, Nationalists and Conservatives (includ-
ing neo-cons and mere opportunists). Communists sup-
port a Russian union with China and the so-called Chinese 
model for Russia’s transformation. Nationalists are opposed 
to this union as they believe that China would be the domi-
nant partner. They want Russia to be a sovereign Eurasian 
centre of power and reap all the benefits of this position. 
Conservatives fear the demise of the EU and the collapse 
of the eurozone, as they have many business interests in EU 
countries and 40 per cent of Russia’s foreign reserves are in 
euro. However, they are firmly against Russia’s European vo-
cation, which presents a threat to the existing system. They 
want to keep European powers divided and extract benefits 
from bilateral relations.
Modernisers are against Russia’s Eurasian vocation, maintain-
ing that it would not work anyway. Integration between au-
thoritarian states is not possible, as such regimes would not 
concede their sovereignty. For them, the Chinese model is 
not an option for Russia, because it revolves around the tran-
sition from an agricultural society to an industrial state. The 
USSR missed this opportunity in the late 1920s.
The Modernisers’ camp is also split into pro-US and pro-EU 
factions. The former – most vividly represented by /free mar-
ket economists close to Jeffrey Sachs – attributes the euro cri-
sis to the social and economic model of EU countries, which 
would be too ‘socialist’ for the globalised economy. Such a 
view prioritises economic models and neglects the political 
aspects of European integration. The pro-EU community is 
not blind to the depth of the euro crisis, and recognises that 
it is systemic. The most compelling indications of the ongo-
ing crisis include the growing mistrust between Brussels and 
ordinary EU citizens, an increasing divide between northern 
and southern EU countries, and the rising tide of national-
ism, the challenges to the multicultural project in Germany, 
France and the UK, and xenophobia and populism in EU 
member states. In this context, the fundamental issue is 
not simply whether the Eurozone survives, but whether the 
core concepts of the European integration will remain viable. 
However, they believe that the EU will come out of this crisis 
stronger and reinstate its position.
Economists from both camps recognise that the euro crisis 
could affect Russia in many ways. A decline in prices for oil 
and metal exports will hit the Russian economy hard. If the 
crisis continues, investors will start to sell not only European 
financial assets, but risk-prone assets from all over the world 
– including Russia. A further escalation of the euro crisis may 
trigger external shocks, which will affect the activity of Rus-
sian credit organisations.
Conclusion
EU-Russia relations are losing their sense of purpose. Both 
sides are confronted with serious problems; the question 
is whether their cooperation can advance in this context. 
Despite their considerable domestic challenges, the medi-
um-term goals of both Russian and EU foreign policies are 
the same: predominance of pragmatic economic interests 
over political or ideological differences, emphasis on bilat-
eral relations and status-(re)building. The guiding principles 
of Russia’s foreign policy under Putin’s will be quid pro quo, 
linking Russian political and military concessions to Western 
economic concessions. If President Putin clearly understands 
what Russia can gain from a particular deal, he will be a reli-
able
partner. Piecemeal cooperation will not put EU–Russia rela-
tions on a new footing. A future paradigm shift would be 
contingent on the EU surviving the crisis, proving the viabil-
ity of its model and defining a clear strategy vis-à-vis Russia, 
based on a careful balance between its values and realistic 
objectives.
However, the EU has a trump card up its sleeve – the visa-
free regime. Achieving that would be a diplomatic coup 
for Putin, raising his popularity among the Russian middle 
class. The critical importance of this issue is generally misun-
derstood in the West. For centuries, contacts with the West 
were limited to Russian aristocracy and then to Soviet no-
menklatura. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the physi-
cal barrier from the East was removed but replaced by the 
visa ‘barrier’ from the West. If a visa-free regime is granted, it 
will not be a concession to Putin, but rather an important 
factor to strengthen people-to-people contacts, to provide 
a basis for a new partnership and to enhance Russian self-
identification as a European nation.
